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Pakistan’s	armed	forces	are	among	the	most	modern,	largest	and	well	funded	in	the	world.	Within	them,	the	
army	is	the	largest	unit	and	the	most	powerful	institution	in	the	country.	In	the	late	1950s,	it	became	a	key	
political	force	and	increasingly	infiltrated	the	economy.	Its	penetration	into	crucial	political	decision‐making	
became	entrenched	 in	 the	 ’80s,	while	 the	greatest	penetration	 into	 the	economy	and	society	 took	place	 in	
following	decade,	and	has	not	been	reversed	to	date.		In	the	paper	we	will	see	how	the	army	turned	into	a	key	
player	on	the	political	scene	and	came	to	control	a	wide	economic	sector,	what	factors	may	have	contributed	
to	its	“over‐development”	and	what	are	its	implications.		
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Introduction 
Pakistan’s armed forces are among the most modern, largest and 
well-funded in the world and the only ones in the Muslim world to be 
endowed with nuclear weapons. As of 2010 the military had almost 
500,000 men, without counting paramilitary units1. Although the military 
component of Pakistan’s budget has decreased since the end of the 1980s, 
military spending remains very high (3.1% of GDP)2. In addition to using 
vast national resources for its defence, the country remains one of the 
main beneficiaries of US military aid despite rocky and at times faltering 
bilateral relations.  
Within the military, which is a voluntary service, the army is the largest 
unit and the most powerful institution in the country. In the next pages we 
will see how it turned into a key player on the political scene and came to 
control a wide economic sector, and what the factors are that may have 
contributed to its “over-development”3.  
A history of military intervention in politics 
After the birth of the country in 1947 the military gradually grew in 
numbers and strength due to several factors, some of which go back to 
colonial times. At the end of the nineteenth century, Punjab, for reasons 
we will return to, had become the major centre of recruitment for the 
Indian army. The British granted land to servicemen and retired military 
personnel and to the pirs and maliks who procured recruits, thus turning 
them into landowners4. This was a reward for their loyalty, a means of 
forging or consolidating alliances with local power networks, and a way of 
attracting new recruits. Moreover, the local bureaucracy was 
strengthened in several ways, and a powerful nexus developed between 
the bureaucracy, the military and the landed elite, which was to survive 
following Partition, when Punjab became the economic and political heart 
of the new state.  
                                                              
1 A. LIEVEN, Pakistan: a hard country, London, Penguin, 2012, p. 166.  
2 Data related to 2012: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS. 
3 For the concept of an over-developed army see H. ALAVI, “The State in Post-Colonial 
Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in K. Gough and H.P. Sharma, (eds.), Imperialism 
and Revolution in South Asia , New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973, pp. 145-73. 
4 I. TALBOT, Punjab and the Raj, 1989-1947, New Delhi, Manohar, 1988, p. 46.  
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This colonial legacy, coupled with a lack of trained civil servants, 
contributed to the progressive induction of the higher military echelons 
into the civil administration, which paved the way for their increasing role 
in politics5. The higher bureaucracy increasingly ruled with the armed 
forces, inviting them to run the state and making concessions to them at 
the expense of “professional politicians”. In the meantime, the communal 
killings and massive movements of people which accompanied Partition, 
as well as the rise of ethnic nationalist movements and tensions with 
Afghanistan and India over Kashmir and the Durand Line respectively, 
created in the country a sense of deep vulnerability. A few months after 
Partition, the first war with India over Kashmir broke out, while 
declarations by Indian politicians that Pakistan would not survive long 
fed fears of national fragmentation. These factors moulded Pakistan’s 
early security perceptions and justified high and increasing budgetary 
allocations to the military6.  
According to many, a factor that greatly contributed to strengthening the 
army and its political role was the underdevelopment of the political 
system, by which is mostly meant inefficient and corrupt politicians7 who 
tried to maximize the interests of their own groups rather than working 
for the common good. The frequent dismissal of governments between 
1947 and ‘58, the factionalism within the party system and its aloofness 
from the general public (the first elections would be held in 1970) did not 
help to boost the image of politicians. The military, which projected an 
image of corporate pride, contrasted starkly with them, appearing as a 
disciplined, organized institution. Undoubtedly, however, the military’s 
increasing political role in turn contributed to the weakness of civilian 
elites and further delegitimized them8, in a mutually reinforcing process.  
                                                              
5 M. AZIZ, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, London, Routledge, 2007, 
pp. 5-6; 100. 
6 Between 1947 and 1949 military spending represented on average more than half of 
the annual budget, and reached 73% in the fiscal year 1950-51: see A. JALAL, The 
State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, Lahore, 
Vanguard, 1991, p. 92. 
7 Of this opinion are S. NAWAZ, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars 
Within, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. xxvii; L. ZIRING, Pakistan: The 
Enigma of Political Development, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 126-36; P.I. 
CHEEMA, The armed forces of Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2000, 
135-36, A. SIDDIQA, Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Economy, London, Pluto, 2007, p. 
244. 
8 S. NAWAZ, (2008), p. xxviii; A. RIZVI, “Pakistan: Civilian-Military Relations in a 
Praetorian State”, in M.R. James and V. Selochan, (eds.),The Military and Democracy 
in Asia and the Pacific, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 2004, pp. 
88-100. 
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Politicians themselves contributed to the military’s politicization by 
asking it to intervene to quell ethnic and religious revolts and to settle 
political differences. Both the Bengali revolt in 1971, and the Baluchi 
revolt in 1973-77 were repressed by the army. While the 1971 intervention 
was decided by General Yahya Khan, the repression in Baluchistan was 
decided by the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who, like the 
higher military echelons, was unwilling to redress ethnic grievances that 
were at the basis of the revolt. More recently, the military was sent to 
northern tribal areas by Musharraf and by subsequent elected 
governments to counter extremist forces, primarily the TTP 
(Tehrik-e-Taliban), that are bent on anti-state activities, causing 
widespread resentment in the area. 
While military repression was naturally not popular in the areas that 
were the target of intervention, the military’s image was boosted 
everywhere during natural calamities, such as the 2010 floods, as its 
efficiency was evidently greater than that of the state apparatus. More in 
general, the state’s dependence on the military, whether to repress or to 
provide emergency aid, has not allowed civilian institutions to control the 
military, creating a vicious circle that is difficult to break.  
When in power, the military did not actually perform that well. The armed 
forced forces rose to power on several occasions through coups, mostly by 
invoking the need to moralize and rationalize the state apparatus, and 
ruled for roughly half of Pakistan’s history (1958-70; 1977-88; 1999-2008), 
legitimized by the judiciary9 and by the apathy –  if not outward sympathy 
– of the population. They were somewhat successful in terms of economic 
growth for a series of geopolitical circumstances, but did not address the 
structural problems of the national economy, did not root out malpractices 
and had a poor record on distributive policies10. But, despite creating some 
disillusions, overall the military continued to enjoy widespread respect 
and its faults were quickly forgotten.  
Civilian rulers did try from the 1970s to decrease the army’s standing, 
though they did so haphazardly: Z.A. Bhutto restructured the military’s 
high command and took some measures to dilute its political role and 
bring it under civilian control, but he himself relied on the armed forces to 
quell urban protests and the Baluchi rebellion. Most importantly, he did 
not alter his security and foreign policies, which remained focused on the 
Indian threat, invested even further in military modernization and 
                                                              
9 On the attitude of the judiciary towards military coups see P.R. Newberg, Judging the 
State. Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.  
10 M.H. KHAN, When is Economic Growth Pro-Poor? Experience in Malaysia and 
Pakistan, New York, IMF, 2002. 
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started the nuclear weapons programme. Ultimately, his attempts to 
control the army while strengthening it led to his demise: he was removed 
by a coup in 1977. When his daughter Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
tried to rein in the army, they suffered the same fate: Benazir was 
removed twice through the president’s collusion with the armed forces, 
and Nawaz Sharif was first sacked by the president and then, in 1999, 
removed by a military coup orchestrated by the army chief Musharraf. 
The Pakistani military gained strength also as a result of wider 
geopolitical circumstances. The emphasis on defence, as mentioned, was 
the product of tensions with Afghanistan and of security calculations and 
fears stemming from the relationship with India. It is significant that the 
growth of the military was particularly evident as a result of the 1965 war 
and as a reaction to India’s rising defence expenditure in that period: real 
defence expenditures almost doubled between ’60-’65 and ’65-’7011. Even 
more relevant was the importance that Pakistan came to have in the eyes 
of the US. In the early 1950s Pakistan became part of the US’ containment 
strategy against the Soviet Union. This alignment, which had been 
pursued by Mohammed Jinnah since Partition, provided the Pakistan 
military with the means to modernize and thus bolstered the army’s 
image of efficiency as compared to civil institutions. The importance of 
Pakistan to the US during the Cold War and, since 9/11 2001, for the “war 
on terrorism”, consolidated the military regimes of Ayub Khan, Zia and 
Musharraf at the expense of more democratic forces.  
The Afghan “watershed” 
In the 1980s Pakistan’s role in the jihad against Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan was amply rewarded by the Reagan administration, which 
provided Zia with sophisticated military equipment and funding as well as 
substantial economic aid. Pakistan’s support of the mujaheddin on behalf 
of “the free world” also justified higher allocations to the defence budget: 
defence spending under Zia dramatically expanded, by ’87-’88 overtaking 
development spending. In that context another event occurred which 
would have deep consequences:  the military high commands, together 
with the ISI, a branch of the secret services, took control of Afghan policy 
and the nuclear sector, and since then have been reluctant to let them go. 
In that decade, as a consequence of Zia’s Islamisation policy and of his 
alliance with religious groups linked to his Afghan policy, maulvis and 
religious teaching were integrated into the armed forces, and senior posts 
were increasingly covered by officers who, like Zia himself, came from the 
lower urban middle class and were as a consequence more 
religion-oriented than their predecessors. Thus the military, already 
                                                              
11 See table in S. NAWAZ, (2008), p.  xxxviii. 
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perceived as a bulwark against territorial fragmentation and India’s “evil” 
designs, could also present itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s “ideological 
borders”. The military-mullah nexus which took form under Zia can be 
actually traced back to 1965 and the 1971 civil war, when the military 
regime conveniently allowed the Jamaat-e-Islami to characterize the 
Indians in 1965 and the Bengali rebels in 1971 as “infidels” against whom 
good Muslims should conduct a jihad. It should be remembered here that 
under the elected Bhutto government Afghan Islamist dissidents started 
to be supported by Pakistan: Zia’s policy of supporting Afghan extremists 
as a geopolitical tool was a continuation of his predecessor’s policy, 
although thanks to considerable foreign support it gained unprecedented 
depth. 
When in the mid-1980s, under external and internal pressure, the 
military regime was forced to restore some degree of democracy, Zia 
devised a system that behind a civilian façade allowed the military to 
control the decision–making process: in 1985 he amended the constitution 
to empower the president, a position he then held, to dismiss parliament 
and the prime minister. Zia used this clause when three years later he 
dismissed Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejio, who had tried to 
have a say on military promotions and attempted to reduce defence 
expenditures. 
“Democratic transitions” and the military 
What happened in the following decade indicates that the military finds it 
difficult to retreat to the barracks and give up its political role, and gives 
us food for thought when we ponder on the “democratic transition” 
following the 2008 national elections. 
After Zia died in 1988, national elections were held producing an elected 
government headed by Benazir Bhutto. However, the security forces 
retained a final say on sensitive issues such as regional policies, defence 
expenditures, and the nuclear sector, and refused any interference in 
internal postings, transfers, promotions, service privileges and perks. 
Both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, as mentioned before, were dismissed 
when they attempted to reassert control over these areas. Defence 
spending remained very high, although the percentage of military 
expenditure in GDP slightly dropped during the 1990s.  
This brings us to an interesting point: both elected and unelected 
governments have neglected the public health and education sector, while 
spending considerable amounts of money on defence12. To be fair, the 
                                                              
12 See for the period ‘88-‘99 see E. GIUNCHI, “Democratic Transition and Social 
Spending: the case of Pakistan in the 1990s”, Democratization, vol. 18, no. 6, December 
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underfunding of social welfare in democratic phases cannot be attributed 
only to the military‘s strength and influence behind the scenes. A factor 
which may explain the limited commitment by governments, whether 
elected or unelected, to social welfare is the structure of Pakistani society, 
where family/biraderi (kinship group) affiliations and crony networks 
make politicians more interested in pleasing their limited constituencies, 
and dominant classes belong to groups – mainly rural elites – which are 
overrepresented in both the major political parties and the national 
assembly13, and thus are, for ideological and self-serving interests, 
uninterested in investing in the socio-economic empowerment of the poor.  
The 1988 transition to democracy made no dramatic difference in terms of 
approach to extremist forces and foreign policy policies, as the decision by 
Benazir and Sharif to support the Taliban proves. This may well be a 
product of the army’s interference, but it could be argued that elected 
leaders share the outlook of the military on some issues including the 
perceived need to control Afghanistan in order to counter India’s 
preeminence in the region and its ‘machinations’, and to do so through 
religious proxies. Civilian elites may be unwilling to cut military expenses 
for the same reason: as the autobiographies of some politicians indicate, 
they are imprisoned in a security paradigm based on the Indian threat 
and the related the fear of fragmentation.  
The increasing strength of Pakistan civil society and openness of its media 
are widely considered a promising factor that may in the long run force the 
military to step back. However, Pakistan society has in the past been quite 
compliant with coups and behind-the-scenes military interference. This 
could be explained by disenchantment with civilian leaders, by a 
widespread obsession with Indian ‘machinations’ aimed at dismembering 
the country, spread by school textbooks and the media, and by the 
military’s ability not only to project an image of discipline and efficiency, 
but also to fulfil some widely felt needs. This was particularly evident 
when the coup by Musharraf was welcomed by wide sectors of Pakistan’s 
civil society. From the outset he adopted the agenda of Pakistan ‘civil 
society’, which is mainly a product of the urban middle class: 
accountability, decentralization of power, gender equality, and good 
governance14, while also promoting ‘enlightened moderation’ against the 
excesses of extremist forces. While passing the NSC act in 2004, which 
                                                                                                                                                
2011, pp. 1270-1290. 
13 S. SHAFQAT, “Democracy and Political Transformation in Pakistan”, in S. Mumtaz, 
J.L. Racine and I. Ali, (eds.), Pakistan: The Contours of State and Society , Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, 225. 
14 A. SHAH, “Pakistan: Civil Society in the Service of An Authoritarian State”, in M. 
Alagappa, (ed.), Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting 
Democratic Space, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 376-77. 
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gave the military a permanent role in decision making on strategic issues 
by creating a consultative body that includes the four most senior military 
personnel, two years later he amended the infamous Zina Ordinance, 
which had been the object of intense criticism by women’s and human 
rights groups. It remains to be seen whether the needs of Pakistan’s 
expanding middle class can be met by new political parties and civil 
society groups. 
The military’s economic interests 
Through the decades the Pakistan military has acquired a prominent 
economic role which takes various forms: in addition to being given a wide 
range of benefits including licenses and large plots of land, reflecting a 
British tradition in the subcontinent15, retired and serving senior officers 
received key posts in the public sector and in state-run corporations. The 
military also penetrated the economy through the business ventures of its 
welfare foundations. Initially created mostly to look after retired and 
disabled soldiers, these foundations today operate a wide array of 
commercial activities, whereby economic and geostrategic interests often 
intersect, and are among the largest business conglomerates in Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s “Milbus” (Military business), as Siddiqa calls it, was rooted in 
pre-colonial times and promoted by the military’s early link with 
post-Partition bureaucracy, but grew between ’54 and ’69, stagnated 
between ’69 and ’77, and expanded dramatically after ’77. In the 1980s the 
army also benefitted from Zia’s privatization policies, which undid Bhutto’s 
nationalization of wide sectors of the economy. The return to a civilian 
government in 1988 did not mark a reversal of the situation; in fact Benazir 
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif provided the military with even greater economic 
opportunities in order to appease it while trying to reduce its political role. 
In this phase the military also entered new areas of business such as 
broadcasting and energy, and opened military-run educational institutions 
that mainly catered to the elites, while serving and retired personnel were 
increasingly found also in public universities and think tanks. This 
contributed among other things to entrenching a process begun through 
curricular reforms in the previous decades that had promoted the image of 
the military as the saviour of the country and the guardian of its integrity 
and ideology. The complex of the military’s economic interests has turned 
the military, in Lieven’s words, into “a giant kinship group, extracting 
patronage from the state and distributing it to its members”16 and has 
                                                              
15 I. TALBOT , (1988), p. 46. 
16 A. LIEVEN, (2012), p. 167. 
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further reduced the autonomy of the state. In particular, the placement of 
military officials in key positions in the Ministry of Defence and in the 
Ministry of Finance has made these institutions subservient to military 
interests17, and made it more unlikely that regional policies may evolve 
away from the paradigm of the Indian security threat.  
As mentioned above in relation to welfare and to state policies addressing 
extremism, it would be too simplistic to just point the finger at the military. 
Its eeconomic interests have made its direct control or political 
interference in politics more entrenched by raising their stake in the 
country’s decisions. It can however be argued that the military’s privileged 
access to state resources and posts and its use of them for extracting 
patronage is part of a more general problem: a culture of entitlement is 
pervasive among all actors on the political stage,18 coupled with a lack of 
commitment to the common good and a predatory approach to state 
resources that can be found among dominant classes in other young 
nations with no strong emotional attachment to the state and 
contradicting identities.   
The ethnic factor 
Most military personnel (75%) come from three districts of Punjab, the 
so-called “Salt Range”. Another 20% from the Khyber Paskhtunkwa19. 
Punjab’s over-representation is even more pronounced within the army20. 
The predominance of this ethnic group goes back to British policies, as 
already mentioned: after the 1857 Mutiny and northward expansion of the 
British, greater numbers of Punjabis were recruited. This pattern 
intensified in the latter part of the century: from 1875 to 1914, Punjab 
troops rose from a third of the total army to three-fifths. Part of this 
development was due to the region’s history, which forced local people to 
develop military prowess to resist invaders from the Frontier; the region 
was also close to Afghanistan, which Britain repeatedly tried to occupy, 
and it was therefore cheaper for the Indian army to recruit from here. 
Thus pragmatic reasons reinforced the martial castes theory that gained 
ground among British officials towards the end of the 19th century.  
The Indian army continued to be dominated by the Punjabis in the 
twentieth century, with the effect of increasing the region’s prosperity. 
After Partition, the Pakistan army inherited this disequilibrium, 
                                                              
17 P.R. CHARI - A. SIDDIQA-AGHA. Defence Expenditure in South Asia: India and 
Pakistan, Colombo, RCSS Policy Studies, 2000, p. 29. 
18 S. NAWAZ, (2008), p. xxxv.  
19 P.P COHEN, The Idea of Pakistan, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2004, 
pp. 223-24.  
20 S. NAWAZ, (2008), pp. 570-71. 
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continuing to be overrepresented by Punjabis and to a lesser degree by 
Pashtuns; the system of rewarding military personnel with perks and 
privileges, land and employment opportunities, which remained in place, 
consolidated the political influence and affluence of Punjabis at the 
expense of other groups. Land transfers to Punjab military personnel in 
non-Punjab areas has time and again created political tensions with the 
local population, particularly in Baluchistan. Contributing to the 
bitterness of non-Punjabi ethnic groups, the military’s welfare funds have 
invested in the largest province, a product of the predominance of 
Punjabis but also of the extent and quality of infrastructures in that 
province.  It can thus be argued that the predominance of Punjabis within 
the army, which mirrors a nation-wide imbalance in all state institutions, 
has fed nationalist claims by minor provinces and contributed to 
disaffection from the centre and to persistent tensions.  
Conclusions 
Several factors, internal and external, partly rooted in colonial policies, 
have contributed to  strengthening the Pakistan military and boosting its 
image since the aftermath of Partition. After 1958, the army became a key 
political force and increasingly infiltrated the economy. Its penetration 
into crucial political decision-making became entrenched in the ’80s, while 
the greatest penetration into the economy and society took place in 
the ’90s, and has not been reversed to date.  
The predominance of the military can be seen as part and parcel of 
predatory politics and a patronage system that characterises all dominant 
classes in Pakistan; as a consequence, any dilution of its power could only 
be pursued through general, and necessarily long-term, processes aimed 
at promoting public scrutiny though education and the media and at 
redressing social and ethnic imbalances. The role of the national security 
paradigm in justifying the military’s strength and its tentacular influence 
in society also points to the need for a rapprochement with India, 
primarily through solution of the Kashmir issue, while Western 
decision-makers should be mindful of the consequences for civilian 
institutions and democratic processes of their strategic imperatives and of 
the military aid that is provided to further them. 
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